TITLE: NIGERIA HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, 1994 AUTHOR: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE DATE: FEBRUARY 1995 NIGERIA General Sani Abacha, who seized power in a palace coup on November 17, 1993, remained Head of State throughout 1994. Under Abacha, the main decisionmaking organ is the military-dominated Provisional Ruling Council (PRC), which rules by decree. The PRC oversees the 32-member Federal Executive Council composed of some of Nigeria's most prominent politicians. Like previous military regimes, Abacha and the PRC claimed they would eventually hand over power to a civilian government, but the PRC did not reveal a timetable, although it initiated a "constitutional conference" over which it had strong influence. Pending a new constitution, some provisions of the 1979 Constitution were observed, although the decree suspending it was not repealed. The regime failed to clarify, however, which aspects of the Constitution remained in effect. Although the regime occasionally made reference to rights or guarantees outlined in the Constitution to suit a particular purpose, it just as often reminded the public of the continued suspension of constitutional rights. Despite several positive initial steps, the PRC showed little respect for human rights after its first month in power, and the political and economic climate steadily deteriorated throughout 1994. New political forces steadily gathered in support of Chief Moshood K. O. Abiola, who on June 12, l993, had won the presidential election, in what national and international observers characterized as the most free and fair election in Nigeria's history, but which was quickly annulled by then military head, General Ibrahim Babangida. In particular, opposition figures united in a new organization called the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO), which campaigned for an immediate return to civilian rule through a "sovereign" national conference. Abiola declared himself President of Nigeria on June 11, 1994. The Government continued to enforce its authority through the Federal Security System (the military, the state security service, and the national police--all of whom were responsible for serious human rights abuses) and through decrees blocking action by the opposition in the courts. Starting in May and June, the Government cracked down hard on the opposition, arresting NADECO members. With Abiola in prison awaiting trial, General Abacha convened a constitutional conference, but the labor movement, led by the National Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG) and the National Labor Congress (NLC), responded with massive strike action, demanding that General Abacha release Abiola and hand over power to a civilian government. The ensuing strikes brought economic life in Lagos and much of the southwest to a standstill for almost 8 weeks. By the middle of September, the military Government became increasingly confident, escalating further the crackdown on its opponents. In the face of the Government's tough actions, most striking workers, fearing arrest and dismissal, soon returned to work, and most of the fight went out of organized labor. At the end of the year, the economy continued its downward slide. While Nigerian elites continued to prosper, unemployment, underemployment, and inflation increased markedly. Nigeria depends on oil exports for over 90 percent of its foreign exchange earnings and 75 percent of its budget revenues. In order to cope with reduced oil revenues, Nigeria implemented an indigenous structural adjustment program (SAP) from 1986 to 1991. While the SAP was a success in some respects, economic conditions for the average Nigerian remained very difficult, and successive military governments increasingly abandoned reform by printing money that fueled inflation. Nigeria's human rights record remained dismal in 1994. General Abacha's policies heightened episodic civil unrest in urban areas. Security forces used excessive force to control the situation, killing and wounding a number of persons, including peaceful protesters. The Abacha Government regularly relied on arbitrary detention and mass arrest as a means of silencing its many critics. To consolidate its hold on power, the regime in August announced a series of harsh decrees restricting press freedom and civil liberties which, like other military decrees, contained clauses prohibiting judicial review of any government action. Security services stepped up routine harassment of human rights and prodemocracy groups, including labor leaders, journalists, and student activists. Other human rights problems throughout the year included extrajudicial killings; police torture; dangerous and unsanitary prison conditions with many deaths; violence and discrimination against women; and infringements on freedom of speech, press, travel, and political and labor affiliation. RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from: a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing As in previous years, police and security services commonly engaged in extrajudicial killings and excessive use of force to quell antimilitary and prodemocracy protests. The most deadly incidents occurred in July and August after the Government deployed police and military units to put down protests in Lagos and other cities in the southwest. There were credible reports that security forces may have killed from 20 to 50 people in the Lagos area alone. Government reports of deaths resulting from the riots were much lower, and the Government asserted that security forces intervened only when confronted by violent criminals. While the victims included hoodlums and looters, who used the protests as cover to engage in violent criminal activities, eyewitness accounts indicated that security forces often fired randomly into crowds, killing innocent bystanders and peaceful demonstrators. Nigerian human rights groups maintain that scores of people die annually while in police custody, though there are no definitive statistics, and the claims are difficult to substantiate. They are, however, accepted by the Nigerian public and remain consistent with other credible reports of police abuse, including the use of torture to extract confessions. The Civil Liberties Organization (CLO), a nongovernmental organization (NGO), publicized the case of Anthony Imo, who died while in police custody in February. Police arrested Imo, a "patent medicine" seller, in Kano and accused him of selling fake pharmaceuticals. Reportedly tortured by police while in custody for several hours, Imo was taken by police to a local hospital where he later died, apparently from brain damage. The Government seldom holds police and security services accountable for the use of excessive, deadly force or the death of individuals while in custody; it made no effort to investigate the conduct of security forces during the July and August prodemocracy protests and denied that protesters died at the hands of government forces. The Government has thus fostered a climate of impunity in which these abuses flourish. According to the Committee for the Defense of Human Rights (CDHR) and the CLO, in January a police patrol in Delta state shot seven men they suspected of being armed robbers. The police maintain the seven fired upon them while trying to run a checkpoint near Warri. In an exchange of fire, the police shot two of the men and arrested the rest of the party. The police then reportedly executed all seven prisoners soon after, including a 70-year-old man. Extrajudicial killing remained common in eastern Nigeria, particularly as conflict between members of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) and government forces escalated throughout the year. In April, spurred by increased violence in the oil-producing area, the Government deployed large numbers of police and military to Ogoniland. Credible reports of increased killings and beatings at police checkpoints and other areas accompanied the deployment. To quell the upsurge of violence in the area, the military administration of Rivers state promulgated a draconian decree imposing the death sentence for "civil disturbances occasioning death," and also for crimes such as "attempted murder." The administration set up a special court, the Civil Disturbances Tribunal, to try such cases. Human rights groups and the press corroborated MOSOP claims that hundreds of people died in the violence which continued unabated despite the military presence and the actions of the Rivers state government. The commander of the military forces in Ogoniland, Major Paul Okuntimo, admitted publicly his forces killed six people from June to August, stating that two were shot when they fired on soldiers, one while trying to escape from detention, and "the remaining three...as a deterrent to their like." b. Disappearance There were no reports of politically motivated disappearances; however, government detention practices have the effect of causing many detainees to be "missing" for extended periods (see Section 1.d.). c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment The 1979 Constitution (suspended) and the 1989 Constitution (never implemented) prohibit torture and mistreatment of prisoners and provide criminal sanctions for such excesses, and the Evidence Act of 1960 prohibits the introduction of evidence obtained through torture. Nevertheless, detainees frequently die while in custody (see Section 1.a.), and there were credible reports that police seeking to extract confessions regularly beat and torture suspects. For example, reports circulated in September that the military beat and nearly tortured to death detained NADECO members. Detainees are regularly kept incommunicado for long periods of time (see Section 1.d.). In its early months in power, the Abacha regime formed the Lagos State Environmental Task Force as part of its "war on indiscipline and corruption." Under the direct supervision of the Lagos state administrator, Colonel Olagunsoye Oyinlola, the Task Force grew increasingly brutal in its attempts to rid Lagos of illegal street traders and mountains of garbage. Task Force soldiers routinely beat and arrested anyone they perceived as being "undisciplined," usually unarmed market women and traders, but also including jaywalkers, errant drivers, children, and young traders who hawk goods on Lagos streets. The Constitutional Rights Project publicized the case of one of its lawyers, Kolawole Olaniyan, who was beaten and horsewhipped after protesting being pressed into a work gang by Task Force soldiers on March 16. Armed soldiers reportedly stopped the bus in which he was commuting and forced the occupants to clean up piles of refuse nearby. Soldiers also targeted young women in short skirts or trousers, humiliating them and sometimes stripping them naked for wearing "immodest clothing." The Government neither acknowledged nor denied that such practices occurred; the perpetrators went unpunished. Conditions in Nigeria's prisons remain life threatening. Lack of potable water, sewage facilities, and medical supplies contribute to deplorable sanitary conditions. Disease runs rampant in the cramped, poorly ventilated facilities. Prison inmates are seldom allowed outside their cells for recreation, and many must provide their own food. In those cases, only those with money or whose relatives bring food regularly have something to eat. Poor inmates rely on handouts from others to survive. There are credible reports that prison officials and police deny inmates food and medical treatment as a form of punishment or to extort money from them. For example, the prison authorities denied Ken Saro-Wiwa, leader of MOSOP, who suffers from a heart condition, access to medical care and food appropriate to his medical condition during his detainment in January and again during his subsequent detention, while ignoring continued requests by Saro-Wiwa's personal physician to see him (see Section 1.d.). There were also credible reports that prison officials kept Saro-Wiwa in chains for at least part of his detention. Severe overcrowding in Nigerian prisons remains a serious problem. For example, Ikoyi prison in Lagos, built to house about 800 inmates, holds over 2,000. The CDHR estimated that 2,000 people die each year in prisons from disease, although the Government admits only to a much lower mortality rate. A correspondent for the Vanguard newspaper reported the death of 40 inmates from tuberculosis in the Warri federal prison since the end of 1993. The Ita Oko detention camp was most likely reopened to ease the burden on other overcrowded facilities. The Government derives considerable savings from the practice of leaving many children born in prison with their jailed mothers rather than placing them in foster homes. d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, and Exile The regime repeatedly engaged in arbitrary arrest and detention (see below). Police are empowered to make arrests without warrants if there is reasonable suspicion of an offense and often abuse this power. Nigerian law requires the arresting officer to inform the accused of charges at the time of arrest and take him or her to the station for processing within a reasonable time. Suspects must be given the opportunity to engage counsel and to post bail. However, police do not generally adhere to these safeguards. They often hold suspects incommunicado under harsh conditions for extended periods without charge; arbitrary detention occurs frequently. Police also commonly place relatives and friends of wanted suspects in detention without charge in an effort to induce the accused to turn themselves in. The State Security (Detention of Persons) Decree of 1984 (Decree Two) provides that the Government may detain without charge persons suspected of acts prejudicial to state security or harmful to the economic well-being of the country. When invoked by the Vice President, the decree suspends the detainee's civil liberties and precludes judicial review. Many Nigerians still consider Decree Two the main threat to their basic freedoms because the judicial ouster clause encourages arbitrary detention and fails to define what constitutes acts prejudicial to state security or the nation's economic well-being. During the year, the Government expanded its authority to detain opponents by promulgating a series of new decrees. One of them, Decree 11, authorizes the PRC Vice Chairman or the Commissioner of Police to detain persons for up to 3 months. Another, Decree 14, forbids courts to order the Government to produce prisoners in court, effectively suspending the right of habeas corpus. The PRC relied heavily on arbitrary arrest and detention throughout the year in an effort to silence its critics. In February, after the Government announced a ban on regional political organizations, security forces arrested and detained without charge retired general and former presidential candidate Shehu Musa Yar'Adua. In March the Government cracked down on human rights groups' activities throughout the nation. The authorities arrested Femi Falana, chairman of the National Association of Democratic Lawyers and two members of the Campaign for Democracy (CD) in Lagos on March 11, but never charged them. Security operatives earlier in the month arrested Oyo state chairman of the CD, Gbenga Awosode, and Kwara state CDHR chairperson, Josephine Okei. Security forces broke up an antiwar rally organized by the CD on March 15 and arrested and detained eight CD members, including Femi Falana and founding member Frederick Fasehun. In the wake of protests against the constitutional conference in May and June, the Government expanded its crackdown, arresting hundreds of prodemocracy agitators. In the wave of arrests, the Government detained and charged with treason several former senators, who declared they had reconvened the disbanded National Assembly, including Senate President Ameh Ebute and Senators Bola Tinubu, Polycarp Nwite, N.A. Okorofor, and Abu Ibrahim. They were released on bail, but the charges against them remained pending. The authorities also arrested and released Tokunbo Afikuyomi, member of the disbanded House of Representatives and former aide to General Abacha's Minister of Foreign Affairs Baba Gana Kingibe, and a number of NADECO members, such as former governor of Plateau state Air Commodore Dan Suleiman; former governor of Benue state Air Commodore Jonah Jang; former governor of Anambra state C.C. Onoh; former governor of Oyo state Bola Ige; and the highly respected politician and statesman, Anthony Enahoro. The authorities detained human rights figures around the country, including CD chairman and NADECO member Beko Ransome-Kuti, who went on a hunger strike to protest the conditions of his detention. The Government arrested on charges of treasonable offenses in late June Chief Moshood K.O. Abiola, widely believed the winner of the annulled June 12, 1993, elections, who declared himself President and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of Nigeria. The Government kept Abiola in isolation for weeks before moving him to Abuja and commencing his trial (see Section 1.e.). Credible reports emerged that Abiola had been humiliated while in custody, and that his family and doctor were only sporadically allowed access to him. In September the regime allowed Abiola's personal physician and other doctors to examine him. Despite the doctors' findings of a serious heart condition, the regime refused pleas from his family and others that he be released for urgent tests that could be performed only in Lagos or abroad. In August and September the regime continued to silence opposition to its rule. It arrested again Chief Anthony Enahoro on August 18, jailing him in the Port Harcourt prison. His family complained that security forces refused them access to see him and that his doctor was unable to assess the 75-year-old Enahoro's medical condition. Enahoro was released without charge in late December after being moved to the Port Harcourt military hospital. Beko Ransome-Kuti was again arrested without charge on September 15, after security operatives entered the offices of the CDHR with a warrant and seized a number of documents. After holding Ransome-Kuti incommunicado for 1 week, the Government charged him with writing threatening letters to the managing directors of Agip and Shell oil companies and released him on bail. In early November, the federal High Court in Lagos ruled that only the federal Attorney General could prosecute cases of treasonable felony, and that because the Government's case against Ransome-Kuti had been filed at the state court level, it was invalid. The Government ignored the ruling, rearresting Ransome-Kuti on November 9, this time also accusing him of receiving 6 million Naira from Abiola to "bomb government installations and strategic buildings." The new Attorney General of the Federation, Michael Agbamuche, defended the Government's actions, saying that the Government had the right to overturn judicial decisions "in certain circumstances." Ransome-Kuti was released on bail soon after, and the case continued at year's end. Noted civil rights activist and lawyer Gani Fawehinmi was arrested on October 1 after announcing the formation of a new political party, the National Conscience (NC). He was released several days later. Throughout the year, government forces harassed and detained from time to time other members of MOSOP, including Ken Saro-Wiwa's brother, Owens Wiwa. Saro-Wiwa also remained in prison at year's end, without access to a lawyer, his family or a doctor. In November the Government announced the formation of a military tribunal to try Saro-Wiwa and other MOSOP members for complicity in the murders of four Ogoni chiefs (see Section 5). The labor movement confirmed that the following labor leaders were in detention at year's end: Frank Kokori, General Secretary of NUPENG; R. Addo, first president of the Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association (PENGASSAN); P. Aidelomon, a PENGASSAN branch chairman; Wariebi Kojo Agamene, president of NUPENG; and Olu Aderibegbe, Chairman of the Edo state NLC. The above cases were not isolated. The Government routinely detained human rights monitors, journalists (see Section 2.a.), and political opponents throughout the year for making or publishing statements critical of the Government. Most often the authorities did not charge the detainees with a crime, held them for brief periods, and questioned them about their activities and statements. Nigeria's total prison population is estimated at 65,000. Human rights groups estimate that as much as 46 percent of this population awaits trial. A precise figure for the number of persons detained without charge is unavailable, and there are no credible estimates of the number of political detainees. There were no known instances of forced exile as a means of political control, although several NADECO members were in self-imposed exile in the United States and the United Kingdom at year's end. e. Denial of Fair Public Trial In its efforts to suppress opposition to its rule, the regime first bypasssed the regular courts in favor of "tribunals" and then declared itself above the law by prohibiting court review of any government action (see below). Decree One of 1984, the Basic Constitution (Modification and Suspension) Decree, the first decree promulgated by the military officers who overthrew the civilian regime of President Shagari in 1983, left the institutional framework of the judiciary relatively intact. However, it established a parallel system of military tribunals with sole jurisdiction over certain offenses, such as coup plotting, corruption, armed robbery, and illegal sale of petroleum. A 1991 decree amended Decree One by providing that only sitting or retired civilian judges may preside over tribunals hearing nonmilitary cases. The PRC retained the tribunal framework. In most cases before the tribunals, the accused have the right to legal counsel, bail, and appeal, though some tribunals substitute a presumption of guilt for the presumption of innocence, and conviction rates in the tribunals reportedly exceed conviction rates in the regular courts. Sentences are generally severe. The Government's reliance on tribunals, which operate outside the constitutional court system, seriously undermines the judiciary's independence and often results in legal proceedings that deny defendants due process. The Government's frequent refusal to respect court rulings also undercuts the independence and integrity of the judiciary. In November the federal Government circumvented a ruling by the Kaduna High Court granting Abiola bail by filing an appeal to the Supreme Court, further calling into question the relevance of judicial decisions. The Government ignored court orders in July requiring that it allow Punch, a daily newspaper closed down by security forces, to reopen. In August a federal High Court ruled the Government in contempt of court for ignoring the ruling. The Court declared the closure of the paper illegal and unconstitutional and ordered the police to vacate the premises, which they did after an additional 11 days. Within 2 weeks, the Government shut down Punch by decree. Seriously damaging the shred of credibility the judiciary retained, the regime in August declared itself above the law. Decree 12 of 1994, enacted on August 18, states that "no act of the federal military government may be questioned henceforth in a court of law," and "divests all courts of jurisdiction in all matters concerning the authority of the federal government." When Attorney General Olu Onagoruwa criticized the decrees as being unconstitutional, the PRC fired him. The regular court system is composed of both federal and state trial courts, state appeals courts, the federal Court of Appeal, and the federal Supreme Court. Under the 1979 Constitution, courts of the first instance include magistrate or district courts, customary or area courts, Shari'a (Islamic) courts, and for some specified cases, the state high courts. The nature of the case usually determines which court has jurisdiction. In principle, customary and Shari'a courts have jurisdiction only if both plaintiff and defendant agree to it. In practice, fear of legal costs, delay, and distance to alternative courts encourage many litigants to choose these courts. Criminal justice procedures call for trial within 3 months of arraignment for most categories of criminals. Inefficient administrative procedures, petty extortion, bureaucratic inertia, poor communication between police and prison officials, and inadequate transportation continue to result in considerable delays, often stretching several years in bringing suspects to trial. Trials in the regular court system are public and generally respect constitutionally protected individual rights, including a presumption of innocence, the right to be present, to confront witnesses, to present evidence, and to be represented by legal counsel. There are no legal provisions barring women or other groups from testifying in civil court or giving their testimony less weight. The testimony of women is, however, accorded less weight in Shari'a courts. There is a widespread perception that judges are easily bribed, or "settled," and that the courts cannot be relied upon to render an impartial judgment. An internal government report submitted to General Abacha in June, later printed in the press, called the judiciary a "disaster institution" and recommended that the federal Government correct the institution's lack of independence and funding, as well as put an end to corruption and bribery among judges. The number of political prisoners (as distinct from political detainees) held by the Government was also unknown. At year's end, M.K.O. Abiola remained in prison, despite a November ruling by the Kaduna federal High Court of Appeals granting him bail on the condition that he "not disturb the peace." The regime refused to honor the ruling, however, and appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. Abiola's trial on treason charges remained suspended indefinitely on orders from the regime. Other long-term political detainees, such as Ken Saro-Wiwa, continued to be held without trial. f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence Provisions of the 1979 and 1989 Constitutions provide for the rights to privacy in the home, in correspondence, and in oral electronic communications. However, the military Government regularly interfered in the lives of its citizens, and if the authorities desired to use a warrant in a particular search case, they often secured it from a military tribunal rather than a regular court. Human rights leaders reported that security agents regularly followed them and cut or tapped their organizations' telephones.